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 Abstract 
Finance ministries are not often studied. The literature on fiscal institutions has so far focused on 
the causes of centralization of budgetary control in the ministry of finance, while the budget re-
form literature studied the shift from traditional micro-budgetary controls to modern macro-
budgetary controls. Neither literature can fully explain why only some countries followed the 
lead of early New Public Management reformers and adopted a strong macro-budgetary regime. 
In this paper, I use fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to understand these reforms in a 
group of 22 countries. I find that the variation can only be explained by a combination of exter-
nal pressure due to fiscal stress and the preferences of officials, which in turn are shaped by or-
ganizational culture.  
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Summary 
Little research has been done into why countries choose different budgetary practices. 
Why do some try to set up a lean, modern finance ministry, while others do not? The aim 
of this paper is to analyze the introduction of modern budgetary control instruments in a 
group of 22 countries over the past two decades. Macro-level controls are taken as a proxy 
for the application of New Public Management (NPM) ideas in public expenditure man-
agement. When reforming their fiscal institutions, countries generally respond to pressures 
to reform that are generated by fiscal underperformance, notably when they are required to 
deal repeatedly with fiscal crises. However, countries’ responses are not uniform and cru-
cially, depend on the prevailing organizational culture. Government officials have some 
discretion over the institutional response, and only the combination of external pressures 
and internal preferences can explain the variation between countries.  
This paper identifies two different reform paths. The first group of countries closely re-
sembles the “modern” ministries identified in the budget reform literature. Exemplified by 
Great Britain, finance ministries in these countries carried out reforms prompted by exter-
nal pressures, dismantling micro-level controls and moving towards a leaner macro-level 
regime. The changes were broadly in line with the preferences of the prevailing organiza-
tional culture – individualistic, flexible, and intolerant of rigid hierarchies. The second 
reform path was pursued by a small group of presidential democracies that introduced 
macro-level controls, but in a very different way: these countries used the new instruments 
as an additional layer of control to further strengthen an already rigid hierarchical admini-
stration. Thus, even in cases where macro-budgetary controls do get adopted, countries do 
not necessarily pursue a straightforward modernization model. 
The results show that institutional innovation does not travel seamlessly between coun-
tries. New budgetary tools did not spread from the initial reformers because budget offi-
cials were uniformly convinced of their intrinsic value. Some countries followed the mod-
ernizing reform path, in others the new tools were integrated into different systems and 
thus turned into a setup not imagined by the original designers. Leaving aside the coun-
tries where the establishment of any type of budgetary centralization is not feasible, there 
are still enough holdouts where macro-controls could be established. However, it seems 
that officials in these countries believe that the costs of reform would not be justified 
given that they already have an acceptable degree of fiscal performance sans reform, and 
that modernization ill matches their cultural preferences. 
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“The Chancellor of the Exchequer should boldly uphold economy in detail […] He is 
ridiculed, no doubt, for what is called candle-ends and cheese-parings, but he is not 
worth his salt if he is not ready to save what are meant by candle-ends and cheese-
parings in the cause of the country.”1 
William E. Gladstone 
1 Introduction2 
Modern finance ministries should be lean and mean guardians of public money. This has 
become an internationally accepted notion of best practice in public expenditure manage-
ment. The “candle-end controls” of traditional bureaucracies should be cut back, as they 
are too inefficient and unwieldy. Many countries have adopted reforms aiming towards 
this ideal, often supported by technical and policy advice from international organizations. 
So far, success has been limited. It has long been argued that evidence of an international 
convergence of public management practices is scant at best (Pollitt 2001b). Increasingly, 
analysts have started to argue that budget reforms based on an ideal notion of modern go-
vernance systems are ill suited for most countries, because this ideal model ignores institu-
tional variation (Andrews 2009), is overly optimistic (Allen 2009), and possibly, counter-
productive (Schick 1998b). Some go so far as to argue that the entire enterprise of trans-
ferring formal institutions is largely futile (Easterly 2008).  
So far, little research has been done into why countries choose different budgetary prac-
tices. Why do some try to set up a lean, modern finance ministry, while others do not? The 
aim of this paper is to analyze the introduction of modern budgetary control instruments in 
a group of 22 countries over the past two decades. Macro-level controls are taken as a 
proxy for the application of New Public Management (NPM) ideas in public expenditure 
management. When reforming their fiscal institutions, countries generally respond to pres-
sures to reform that are generated by fiscal underperformance, notably when they are re-
quired to deal repeatedly with fiscal crises. However, countries’ responses are not uniform 
and crucially, depend on the prevailing organizational culture. Government officials have 
some discretion over the institutional response, and only the combination of external pres-
sures and internal preferences can explain the variation between countries.  
The paper identifies two different reform paths. The first group of countries closely re-
sembles the “modern” ministries identified in the budget reform literature. Exemplified by 
Great Britain, finance ministries in these countries carried out reforms prompted by exter-
nal pressures, dismantling micro-level controls and moving towards a leaner macro-level 
regime. The changes were broadly in line with the preferences of the prevailing organiza-
tional culture – individualistic, flexible, and intolerant of rigid hierarchies. The second 
reform path was pursued by a small group of presidential democracies that introduced 
                                                 
1  Cited in Hirst (1931, 243). 
2  Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Conference of the European Group for Public Ad-
ministration (EGPA) in Malta 2009 and the General Conference of the European Consortium for Politi-
cal Research (ECPR) in Potsdam 2009. I would like to thank Patrick Dunleavy, Jörg Faust, Mark 
Hallerberg, Christian von Haldenwang, Stefan Leiderer, Anna Pattaro and Joachim Wehner for com-
ments on earlier drafts of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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macro-level controls, but in a very different way: these countries used the new instruments 
as an additional layer of control to further strengthen an already rigid hierarchical admini-
stration. Thus, even in cases where macro-budgetary controls do get adopted, countries do 
not necessarily pursue a straightforward modernization model. 
Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) is a method used for studying the 
“conditions of occurrence” of a particular phenomenon (Rihoux / Ragin 2008, 3). The 
phenomenon in question is the uneven introduction of macro-budgetary controls. FsQCA 
assigns each case a membership score in the outcome (dependent variable) and a number 
of causal conditions (independent variables). Using Boolean algebra, one can then identify 
the particular combinations of causal factors that are sufficient to bring about the outcome. 
It is quite possible for different combinations to cause the outcome, thus making it con-
ceivable for individual causal factors to have different effects depending on the overall 
combination of factors in that particular case. Given that it is likely a complex combina-
tion of factors that explain why some countries carry out these budgetary reforms, fsQCA 
seems to be a method likely to generate new and relevant conclusions.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section will discuss the his-
torical evolution of different types of controls over public spending. It will show that fi-
nance ministries traditionally upheld fiscal discipline through detailed micro-level con-
trols. A shift towards a macro-budgetary control regime only became a viable option over 
the last generation or so. Section 2 will describe the different causal mechanisms that ex-
plain the variation between countries; in other words, why a country moves to adopt a cer-
tain combination of micro-level and macro-level controls. This will inform the choice of 
variables in the subsequent analysis. The third section will outline the data and methods 
used in the fsQCA analysis. The final section will present and discuss the results, followed 
by conclusions.  
2 The evolution of control over public expenditures  
This section will describe the origins of budgetary control instruments and institutions and 
outline the distinction between micro-level and macro-level budgetary controls. Today’s 
finance ministries are embedded in an institutional setup that originates in pre-modern 
times. Up until very recently, the main set of tools available for treasurers was the rigid 
pursuit of savings. Yet, for a very long time, there has been a tension between control over 
individual budgetary items and spending units on the one hand, and control over the pur-
pose and totals of the budget on the other. The macro-budgetary tools that gained currency 
with the spread of the New Public Management were presented as a genuine innovation to 
address budgetary totals without sacrificing control over spending discipline. 
The elements of contemporary budgeting and budgetary control did not fall into place pu-
rely by functional logic. States in Western Europe entered the modern age as organizations 
based on the personal landholdings of the king, the state organization largely congruent 
with the king’s household. Early modern expenditure control was primarily concerned 
with keeping the treasure together. As the executive, i.e. the king, needed to finance ever 
larger armies, he had to negotiate more and more taxes and debt issues with his subjects, 
and develop ever larger bureaucracies to collect and expend them. In Britain, for instance, 
the percentage of state revenues appropriated by parliament rose from 27 % by the end of 
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the 16th century to 97 % around 1700 (Reinhard 1999, 323). The states that were best able 
to go through these mutually reinforcing steps turned from the households of kings into 
territorial nation states over the course of the 16th to the19th centuries (Elias 1976; Tilly 
1992). A state’s sources of revenue have a strong causal influence on its governance 
(Campbell 1993; Moore 2003). Ultimately, all tax collection relies on some measure of 
voluntary contribution from taxpayers; otherwise the costs of enforcing tax collection 
would hardly be sustainable (Levi 1989). The more the state relied on taxation from a 
broad base of citizens, the more these taxpayers cared about the use of their money and 
developed a stake in the state (Moore 2004). As a result, citizens developed a growing 
stake in parliamentary oversight of executive spending.  
The classic case in the literature for this evolution is Britain. Parliament appropriated 
funds to the executive for the king to use, but it had a strong interest in an effective control 
institution within the executive to rein in spending by a fragmented administration. The 
emergence of disciplined parties in the British legislature itself, contributed strongly to the 
establishment of a long-term perspective in the management of the public purse (Stasa-
vage 2003). The British Treasury became the model of a strong central finance ministry 
that kept a tight rein on spending, down to the individual candle-end (Roseveare 1969; 
Thain / Wright 1995, 502). It now sees itself as the “taxpayer’s representative in govern-
ment”, because its overarching aim is to ensure responsible and efficient public spending 
on behalf of the population (Lipsey 2000, 141). Similarly, the French administration only 
developed its rigid expenditure controls in the 19th century, after the executive came under 
legislative control for the first time in the French revolution (Lord 1973, 4).  
The budget - in the modern sense of it being comprehensive, regular, proposed and exe-
cuted by the executive, voted and controlled by the legislature and codified by law - is a 
relative latecomer. It is important to note that the perennial struggle between kings and 
legislatures was fought over appropriations, not budgets (Schick 2002). In Germany, Brit-
ain and France, the budget process developed its modern form in the 1860s and 70s 
(Morsey 1957; Roseveare 1969, 140; Lord 1973, 6), more than a century after legislative 
authority over appropriations was soundly established in Britain (Schick 2002, 20). The 
institution of a central finance ministry predates parliamentary control and the budget 
process by centuries. However, a modern budget makes little sense without a degree of 
formal democracy, where different actors participate in budgeting to process their over-
lapping claims on public funds and to keep the executive in check. At the centre of con-
trolling expenditures sits the finance ministry, which manages the relationship with the 
legislature on behalf of the remaining bureaucracy and in turn controls the bureaucracy on 
behalf of the legislature. 
Even in this traditional setting two different meanings of control are already apparent, bea-
ring evidence that control in the public sector is surprisingly difficult to define (Hood 
2000). First, expenditure control implies a centralization of authority in one actor, a hier-
archical structure where money can only be spent by one actor after being authorized by 
another. The exercise of control takes place inside the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, 
without interference from the outside. It affects the formulation and execution phases of 
the budget process, which are both largely internal to the executive. Its main purpose is to 
keep money from slipping away unauthorized and unaccounted for. Its instruments are 
necessarily detailed and regulate the micro-level details of administrative behaviour. 
When this administrative control is successful, the budget is executed as intended.  
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In the second sense, control refers to the broader process of public spending, and the abil-
ity to control its outcomes. A government that finances itself through broad-based taxation 
will find certain kinds of expenditures, levels of debt, and spending more desirable than 
others, and so will its voters. Yet countries often find themselves with higher debt, higher 
spending and expenditures different from the preferences of any of the main actors of pub-
lic spending, even if the budget is administratively under control. This is due to a lack of 
expenditure control at the macro-level. A central argument of this paper is that these two 
controls are fundamentally different. They require actors to do different things, result in 
different institutions, and the way they are combined varies strongly and systematically 
between countries. 
I will use the terms “micro-level” and “macro-level” to distinguish these two kinds of con-
trol (Krause 2009). Schick uses similar terms to describe two different ways of formulat-
ing the budget. He defines “micro-budgeting” as budgetary decisions taken at the level of 
the spending unit which then inform the process of formulating the budget from the bot-
tom up, and “macro-budgeting” as decisions taken with regards to the total budget as a 
way of predetermining the framework of budget negotiations and enforcing budget formu-
lation from the top down (Schick 1986; Schick 1988). 
Table 1 shows the different instruments of micro versus macro-level controls that minis-
tries of finance could use to maintain their role in the budget process. Micro-level control 
is exercised at the level of spending ministries and quite often, reaches very deeply into 
the daily operation of spending units within these ministries. In a very traditional setting, it 
would not be uncommon for the finance ministry to have officials posted within spending 
ministries to keep spending decisions in check. In the absence of strong controls, authority 
over spending would revert back to the spending minister. Macro-level controls, on the 
other hand, aim at the broad framework of the budget and leave considerable discretion to 
officials in the day to day operation of spending ministries. The combination of perform-
ance measurements, multiannual budgeting and fiscal rules aims to allow the finance min-
istry to make efficient allocation decisions, keep overall spending in check, and set the 
right incentives for officials in spending ministries to pursue operational efficiencies.  
Most authors agree that the most fundamental purpose of budgetary control is to ensure 
fiscal discipline (Campos / Pradhan 1996; Holmes 1998; Schick 1998a). The budget is the 
key mechanism through which modern governments match available resources with 
spending priorities. Without a credible budget, a government lacks the key instrument for 
knowing what it does and doing what it wants. To see that budgetary control is by no 
means natural, one does not have to consult the history books, since this continues to be 
the case in many developing countries (Rakner et al. 2004; Wilhelm / Krause 2007). The 
traditional way to achieve fiscal discipline would correspond to the micro-level controls 
identified above. 
In order to achieve control over broader measures of budgetary outcomes, micro-level 
controls might not suffice and finance ministries would need to develop institutions that 
allow them to exercise authority over the entire budget process. Developed countries have 
only fairly recently been in a position to develop such macro-level controls, and this pheno-
menon was mostly driven by two developments. First, their public sectors expanded mas-
sively after the end of the Second World War (Tanzi / Schuhknecht 2000), and, second, 
that expansion was followed by the austerity of the late 1970s and 80s. The post-war ex- 
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pansion and corresponding changes in societal expectations about the role of the state 
made it increasingly necessary to develop institutions for processing fiscally relevant poli-
cies. This was in contrast to earlier times when most public spending went towards war 
making. Even in the expansionary period, however, there were enough incremental reve-
nue increases to avoid the making of painful choices. Incremental budgeting (Wildavsky / 
Caiden 2004) does not require a strong finance ministry. It was only a situation of auster-
ity that made tradeoffs between portfolios much harder in the absence of a stronger meas-
ure of central control over budget totals (Bozeman / Straussman 1982). 
How did finance ministries go about adjusting to these fundamental changes? Is there a set 
of budgetary instruments that are clearly associated with different objectives? With regard 
to fiscal discipline, micro-level control institutions and a line-item budget are the tradi-
tional responses. According to the budget reform literature, the evolution of control insti-
tutions of the finance ministry seems to follow an arc-shaped path. Control increases over 
time until fiscal discipline is firmly established. It is then relaxed again as authority is de-
legated to spending ministries and meanwhile controls become more flexible in pursuit of 
managerial efficiency and policy objectives. This perspective reflects the broader NPM 
view of public sector reform, where “control” is often seen as bureaucratic and inefficient.  
The macro-budgetary toolkit started to spread throughout the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) world as the “epistemic community” of budget 
practitioners (Haas 1992; Candler 2008) became familiar with the ideas of the NPM after 
the early 1980s. Many OECD countries implemented such reforms over the past 25 years, 
with profound, albeit ambiguous, effects on budgeting. The theoretical argument of the 
NPM-inspired budget reforms is fairly clear (see Figure 2). Previously, finance ministries 
would use the same set of tools to encourage efficiencies and to maintain fiscal discipline, 
 
Table 1:  Micro- and macro-level controls defined 
Instruments of micro-level control Instruments of macro-level control 
• The finance ministry introduces ceilings on the 
initial budget requests at a line item level. 
• Disputes between spending ministers and central 
budget authority during budget formulation are 
resolved by the minister of finance. 
• Appropriations in the budget are specified below 
the agency level. 
• The ministry of finance controls spending in-
creases during budget execution. 
• The ministry of finance has the authority to cancel 
appropriated spending during budget execution. 
• Approval from the ministry of finance is required 
before spending ministries can reallocate (“vire”) 
funds between line items in their budget. 
• The ministry of finance exercises authority over 
spending ministries carrying over funds from one 
budget year into the next. 
• The formulation of the economic assumptions 
used in the budget process is under sole au-
thority of the ministry of finance. 
• The central budget authority supervises com-
pliance with fiscal rules.  
• The finance ministry is in charge of multi-
annual budgeting. 
• The finance ministry has the authority to limit 
legislative changes to the executive budget 
proposal. 
• The finance ministry is in charge of perform-
ance targets. A significant proportion of the 
budget is explicitly linked to performance in-
dicators. 
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namely to haunt spending units inside ministries with micro-level controls. The main level 
of intervention was at the ministerial level or below. Macro-level controls could poten-
tially deliver a much leaner and more effective system. The level of intervention would 
shift to the aggregate budget, leaving the internal operations of spending units mostly 
alone. Operational and allocative efficiency could still be served, and in fact, to a much 
larger extent.  Managers in the ministries could now be held accountable for aggregate 
results and they would have an incentive to use their increased discretion to pursue effi-
ciencies more effectively than any central, distant agency could. These reforms were im-
plemented first and foremost in the well-know reform cases of the United Kingdom (UK), 
Australia, New Zealand and later in Sweden; and probably least in Germany and Austria 
(Wanna / Jensen / de Vries 2003, xxvi). Australia, for instance, dismantled many central 
input controls in the mid-1980s. In return for granting more flexibility to spending minis-
tries, the government developed a macro-budgetary system based on outputs and a me-
dium-term framework, with the explicit aim of improving both allocative efficiency and 
fiscal discipline (Blöndal et al. 2008). 
In the budget reform literature there is no agreement on the actual effects these reforms 
had on the role of the finance ministry, not even for OECD countries, which have seen 
their fair share of research. In 2003, the OECD held a conference about the role of central 
budget agencies (CBAs), to discuss the question “Has the power of the Central Budget 
Agency  become so strong that it crowds out other actors?” (OECD 2003, 2). The OECD 
argued that the more austere fiscal environment of earlier years had empowered central 
budged agencies tremendously, a trend that was only reinforced by new budgetary instru-
ments. On the other hand, Schick (in another OECD publication of the same period) stated 
that the “traditional role of the central budget office is incompatible with the management 
reforms enfolding in various OECD member countries” (Schick 2001, 9). This was be-
cause the reforms rob the CBAs of their main levers of control, which causes some of 
them to fall into “an institutional identity crisis. They know what they are no longer to do, 
but are much less certain as to what they should do” ((Schick 2001, 12). 
Figure 1:  The impact of the new public management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
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While budget reformers study the introduction of different budgetary instruments over 
time, fiscal institutionalists predominantly look at the different institutions that allow a 
centralization of budgeting authority in the pursuit of better fiscal performance and to 
counter the effects of the common pool resource problem in budgeting (von Hagen / 
Harden 1995; Velasco 1997; Alesina et al. 1999). Their definition of finance ministry con-
trol (or centralization) encompasses both micro and macro-level institutions, without ex-
plicitly using that distinction. Centralization can take a variety of forms, namely through 
limiting legislative budget authority, or different fiscal rules, but the authority of the fi-
nance ministry is essential. Certain conditions need to be in place in order to make the 
delegation of control to finance ministries possible, most importantly the size and ideo-
logical coherence of coalition governments, which is, in turn, determined by a country’s 
salient cleavages and its voting system, as well as the competitiveness of the electoral sys-
tem, i.e. the degree to which a government fears being replaced by a credible challenger at 
the next election (Hallerberg 2004; Hallerberg / Strauch / von Hagen 2009). Fiscal institu-
tionalists do not discuss shifts between micro and macro level controls. Over time, fiscal 
controls in general have increased since the 1980s, at least in Europe (Hallerberg 2004) 
and in Latin America (Scartascini / Filc 2007). 
Theoretically, one could make the case that macro-budgetary controls work similarly in 
poorer countries as well. Early proponents of the NPM explicitly underline its universal 
ambition, irrespective of culture or institutional context (Osborne / Gaebler 1992). How-
ever, the implications of the NPM for budgeting in developing countries, where historical, 
economic and institutional contexts are different from the classical Western democracies, 
has been the subject of some debate. The idea that NPM reforms would make large and 
overregulated public sectors in developing countries more efficient and more capable be-
came highly popular in the international community after the mid-1990s (World Bank 
1997; World Bank 2000). Schick, on the other hand, argued that in most developing coun-
tries, the necessary conditions for such advanced institutions were not present; that coun-
tries could not “leapfrog” stages (Schick 1998b). There is some evidence for bureaucracies 
in general that countries do not fare well under NPM reforms (Roberts 2003). Instead clas-
sical Weberian structures seem to improve bureaucratic quality (Rauch / Evans 2000). 
What holds, in general, for broader NPM-type reforms does not necessarily have to hold 
for budgeting in particular, which covers only a subset of public management, new or old.   
It took centuries to establish the prevailing setup in the OECD, where budgetary decision-
making is at the heart of democratic governance between executive and legislature. How-
ever, up until the 1970s and 80s, the struggle for control over public spending was a fairly 
blunt and straightforward affair, in which the finance ministry sought to maintain its 
dominance over spending departments, be it on behalf of the king, prime minister or of the 
parliament. A budget system based on macro-level controls only became a viable option 
after its instrumental toolkit gained currency in international policy circles and met a gro-
wing demand for new solutions to the fiscal challenges of the austerity era after 1980. O-
ver the last generation, countries responded to these challenges with a great variety of in-
stitutional combinations.  
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3 Institutional variation and the determinants of fiscal control regimes 
This section aims to develop a framework to analyze the causal mechanisms behind varia-
tions in the occurrence of macro-budgetary control instruments between countries. It will 
consider both external factors that push countries to enact reforms of their budget process, 
as well as internal factors that shape the direction of these reforms. Only very specific 
combinations of different variables would cause a country to adopt a budgetary control 
regime that relies heavily on macro-budgetary controls. I will discuss external and internal 
factors in turn, making clear at each step what causal effect they would have, and under 
what assumptions this causality would hold. This framework will then determine the choi-
ce of causal factors in the fsQCA analysis.  
For an actor to exercise control over the executive bureaucracy is always costly. Transac-
tion costs involve the price of gathering and processing information, as well as the costs of 
passing and executing decision through long chains of command. Apart from the costs of 
maintaining such controls, especially in the case of large and complex bureaucracies, one 
can also assume that a minimal threshold of organizational and individual capacity is re-
quired to establish such controls in the first place. Although many least-developed coun-
tries may not make it past this minimum threshold, it can safely be assumed that most 
middle-income and richer countries have the prerequisites in place. This does not mean 
that effective control exists, but rather, that the formal instruments and tools of budgetary 
control do exist within the central budget agency of those countries, however rudimentary 
or ineffective they may be.  
It is my assumption that countries start with relatively fragmented governments, where the 
finance ministry seeks to gain control over sector ministry spending by means of different 
budgetary instruments. Each minister controls his own “fiefdom”, where he seeks to direct 
spending in a way that benefits his interests, which may not necessarily align with those of 
the government as a whole (Hallerberg 2004, 26–28). This lack of central control is a 
long-running theme in the study of bureaucracy. Weber described it as the normal state of 
affairs in an administration lacking strong parliamentary (i.e. external) oversight, because 
each bureaucrat would seek the attention of the monarch (i.e. the head of the executive) to 
get ahead in the race to divide the spoils of office (Weber / Winckelmann 1958, 155).  
In terms of the control type, I assume micro-level controls to be the default set of institu-
tions. If countries display macro-level controls, it is assumed that they were adopted in the 
last 25 years. Micro-level controls have developed over the course of centuries, while 
macro-level controls only became a widely known alternative after they were comprehen-
sively applied in some Anglo-Saxon countries in the early 1980s3. It follows that the mac-
ro-level controls observable today are either the consequence of some constant factors that 
consistently affect a country over time or of events or changes that occurred around or 
after the early 1980s. While some isolated macro-level controls might have existed before, 
they would only result in relatively low scores on the macro-level control index. For a 
                                                 
3  Some elements of macro-budgetary control, such as performance budgeting, date back much further 
than 1980. Particularly in the United States, some form of performance-oriented budget reform was at-
tempted in most decades after the 1930s, either by states or the federal government. However, the NPM-
inspired reforms of the 1980s for the first time attempted to introduce multiple macro-budgetary instru-
ments in one comprehensive effort. 
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country to have a high score, several of different instruments would have to be in use, so-
mething I assume was not the case in earlier decades. The spread of the New Public Man-
agement as a comprehensive, though not necessarily uniform or consistent, reform agenda 
after circa 1980 is well documented in the literature (Hood 1995; Pollitt 2001a; Barzelay 
2002). 
Based on the experience of OECD-countries over the last generation, it seems that the 
principal external driver of reforms to the budget system is fiscal underperformance. If it 
is costly to change the status quo, and if the budget process can operate with reliable an-
nual increases in revenue, then there would be little need for central ministries to push for 
greater control over the way other ministries spend public money. If, on the other hand, 
the finance ministry needs to steer the government through repeated austere budget cycles, 
pressure would mount to re-structure the budget process in a way that gives finance minis-
tries the budgetary tools it desires in order to manage austerity.  
The degree to which finance ministries can succeed in establishing any sort of control de-
pends on the political framework, namely on the composition of the government and the 
competitiveness of the electoral system. Centralization of control in the finance ministry is 
more likely in countries where governments in power are relatively ideologically coherent 
and where elections could credibly put opposing parties into power. Why some countries 
end up with high levels of macro control is, however, a separate question. There are sev-
eral alternative explanations in the literature. Proponents of the New Public Management 
argue that macro-control institutions are not just a more efficient way of organizing the 
expenditure process, they are also necessary to deal with more complex budgetary chal-
lenges that go beyond the immediate needs of fiscal discipline. If the finance ministry 
wants to be able to address allocative and operational efficiency, it must dismantle at least 
parts of its micro-controls, and develop macro controls in their stead. Fiscal institutional-
ists, on the other hand, do not make a neat distinction between micro and macro controls. 
From their point of view a ministry of finance would always find it desirable to centralize 
power and would not, voluntarily, give up any lever of control. Empirical evidence sug-
gests that there is no straightforward answer. Some countries do indeed focus on one type 
of control over the other, and vice versa, but there are also a few countries that maintain a 
high degree of control on both levels (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Variation of control regimes 
 Low micro-level control High micro-level control 
High macro-level control  “Modern” 
• Great Britain 
• Latvia  
“Zealous” 
• Chile 
• South Korea 
Low macro-level control  “Weak” 
• Argentina 
• Belgium 
“Traditional” 
• Germany 
• Austria  
Source:  Krause (2009) 
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Regarding the direction of budgetary reforms, I assume that a crucial input comes from the 
officials of the central government bureaucracy. Within certain boundaries, they enjoy a 
degree of discretion over the institutional choices of governments, they are able to shape 
the bureaucratic structure in which they work (Dunleavy 1992). Finance ministries should 
traditionally prefer an organization structured like a machine bureaucracy (Mintzberg 
1979, 314). The spending departments resemble the operating core that implements gov-
ernment spending and the finance ministry is part of the strategic apex that exercises top-
down control. Internally, the finance ministry would again be a smaller machine bureauc-
racy, with a large number of budget analysts, control officers and accountants in the oper-
ating core and a small group of top-level staff interacting with cabinet, president, and par-
liament. Their organizational culture is hierarchist, in the grid/group theory sense, that is 
highly cohesive and rule-bound (Hood 2000, 9).  
If it moved towards strong macro-level controls, the finance ministry would shift its for-
mal structures towards a lower grid and lower group, i. e. individualist position (Dunleavy / 
Hood 1994). It can be assumed that organizational culture is relatively stable over time 
(Hofstede 2003, 454); therefore a reorganization of this kind would most likely be an ef-
fort to bring the formal structures in line with pre-existing cultural preferences. Structur-
ally, a large part of the relatively simple control apparatus in the operating core would 
become redundant, while the professionalization of staff would rise, reflecting the de-
mands of performance budgeting and management techniques. The new organization 
would be a professional bureaucracy, possibly combined with adhocratic elements where 
the operation becomes highly complex and volatile (Mintzberg 1979, 366). Such a move 
would only be feasible in a context where the organizational culture of the broader public 
sector actually supports the new framework. In those cases where the organizational cul-
ture supports a shift towards macro-level controls, the innovations spread by the NPM 
make a new structural option available that previously did not exist. In other words, offi-
cials in the UK and elsewhere might have preferred such a setup all along, but a feasible 
option simply did not exist. 
A final possibility would be for countries to adopt macro-level controls without relaxing 
micro-level controls in turn. Finance ministries would essentially bind other actors in the 
budget process to a new set of rules, without keeping their end of the bargain – that is, to 
give up some of the old controls. Such an instance of over-emphasis on all available con-
trol tools would probably not be an expression of the NPM-influenced, individualist or-
ganizational culture just described. In fact, the most likely places to pursue this path would 
be countries where organizations place a premium on uncertainty avoidance and hierarchy, 
so that central ministries pursue control zealously. It would be more likely in presidential 
systems that finance ministries would successfully obtain high levels of control in both 
dimensions and this is for two related reasons. First, because the president is directly elec-
ted and the executive administration is further removed from the legislative branch of go-
vernment, the finance ministry is more autonomous in shaping its formal structures. In a 
parliamentary system, multiple control bodies could also exercise oversight and report to 
the legislature, and ultimately to the prime minister, who would by default be the head of 
the executive and hold a majority of the votes in the legislature. Second, precisely because 
of this relatively stronger autonomy, the bureaucracy in a presidential system would also 
be less constrained by accountability obligations towards the legislature and other inde-
pendent audit bodies, thus reinforcing the (self-) perception of the finance ministry as the 
only guardian of taxpayer’s interests in government. This role as the only actor working to 
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keep spending under control might cause the finance ministry to adopt a zero-sum per-
spective towards any sort of discretion for sector ministries, thus making it very reluctant 
to grant more autonomy over micro-budgetary decisions.  
Finance ministries are not wont to adopt reforms that turn them into leaner, meaner guar-
dians simply because NPM-type reforms were adopted in a few Anglo-Saxon countries. 
While the spread of new and professionally appealing ideas about control instruments is 
certainly an important precondition for macro-controls to spread, it is by no means a suffi-
cient one. Reforms are costly, and without external pressure they may never take place. 
Fiscal underperformance does not, however, automatically push countries to adopt macro-
level controls and relax micro-level controls. Instead, officials within the central bureauc-
racy have some discretion over the direction of reforms, and will only prefer a shift to-
wards macro-level controls if these match the prevailing organizational culture. The fol-
lowing section will outline a fuzzy set QCA analysis to test these propositions in a group 
of 22 countries.  
4 Setup of the fuzzy-set QCA analysis 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis seems particularly suited to explain the variation in mi-
cro- and macro-level controls between countries. It is a method developed by Ragin and 
others to understand causal relationships among a relatively small number of cases (Ragin 
1987). My main hypothesis is that countries need a specific combination of factors to cau-
se governments to shift their control regime towards the macro-level. I am interested in the 
causal paths that lead to the occurrence of this outcome. No single factor would be suffi-
cient to cause the shift by itself, nor would there be a single necessary factor that has to be 
present in all cases displaying high macro levels. Based on the causal understanding de-
veloped in section 2 above, I will consider five causal factors: (1) pressure to reform due 
to fiscal (under)performance; preferences for different control regimes in the organiza-
tional culture, as expressed by their tolerance for (2) hierarchical structures, (3) individual 
discretion; and (4) uncertainty avoidance; and (5) finally if a country has a parliamentary 
system or not.  
In order to better understand the causes leading countries to develop a strong macro-level 
control regime, this paper will use fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) for 
a group of 22 countries. The country selection was determined by the availability of data 
on both the cultural and economic dimensions, severely limiting the final number of cases. 
Only democratic countries of at least middle-income status, as defined by the World Bank, 
are taken into account (World Bank 2007). The analysis seeks to understand the occur-
rence of a high macro score as a function of the five causal factors outlined below. In a 
fuzzy set analysis, each case is assigned a partial membership and non-membership in 
each of the sets constituted by the causal factors on one side and the outcome on the other 
side (Ragin 2000; Rihoux / Ragin 2008). Instead of the linear relationship between spe-
cific variables, my main interest is in the specific combination of causal factors that 
brought about the outcome. This need not be linear; in fact it is quite unlikely that linear 
regression analysis applied to this data would yield any meaningful results. More impor-
tantly, fsQCA is well equipped to deal with the relatively small number of cases. 
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Each set is calibrated to result in a score between 0 (non-membership) and 1 (member-
ship). A value of 0.5, the crossover point, would signify indifference towards that particu-
lar factor. For each of the following causal factors, the specific value for membership, 
non-membership and indifference has to be specified, so that every country can be ex-
pressed as a combination of five values between 0 and 1 and thus their membership in the 
five relevant sets. Combined with their score on the index of macro-level controls, it 
would be possible to trace the causal relationship between the occurrence of a high macro-
level score and the five causal conditions. 
The most immediate measure of budgetary reform pressure would be the deficit. I col-
lected (based on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook Data-
base4) deficit data for 22 countries from 1980-2005. The average deficit over time is not 
very useful for the purpose of this analysis. Countries might be unable to do much about 
the level of the deficit and might even be comfortable with a certain deficit level that does 
not change much from year to year. Instead, I constructed a simple measure of budgetary 
austerity caused by fiscal crises. An austere budget cycle is defined as a budget deficit that 
is at least one percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) larger than the previous year. I 
assume that such a drastic short-term deterioration in the government’s fiscal position will 
make considerable adjustments necessary, i.e. the deterioration would need to be followed 
by a period of austerity. The austerity cycles are then simply added to arrive at an overall 
score, ranging from 2 (Germany) to 9 (Israel). The higher the number of austere budget 
cycles, the greater the pressure to reform the budget process. Countries would have full set 
membership after a score of 7. If the budget significantly deteriorated in 7 years out of 25, 
taking into account the likely upswings in of intervening years, volatility should be almost 
unbearably high, making year-to-year planning very difficult, very likely increasing long-
term debt and thus raising the pressure to reform. A score of 2, also the lowest occurrence 
in the dataset, would constitute non-membership. The crossover point is at a score of 3.99, 
meaning that countries would suffer from at least some reform pressure through austere 
budget cycles if they experienced at least 4 such events between 1980 and 2005.  
Organizational cultures across countries are difficult to measure. I use as proxy three mea-
sures developed by Hofstede (2003). His research tries to measure the variation in organ-
izational values and norms across 56 countries and is based on a wide range of surveys 
and studies. These measures do not specifically refer to public sector organizations; they 
seek to capture the prevailing patterns of work-related values in a given country. His work 
has been criticized for not being able to make any specific statements about the behavior 
of particular individuals or organizations. However, the evidence compiled by Hofstede is 
convincing enough to allow statements about general patterns and variations across coun-
tries (Smith 2002). Hofstede’s cultural dimensions have been used for numerous cross-
country studies (Kirkman / Lowe / Gibson 2006), including as an independent variable in 
cross-country analyses of public sector issues (Husted 1999). Pollit and Bouckaert suggest 
that Hofstede’s cultural dimensions provide precisely the kind of data one would need in 
order to better understand the appropriateness of institutional choices in different adminis-
trative contexts (Pollitt / Bouckaert 2004). 
                                                 
4  In the cases of Mexico and Chile, IFS figures were complemented by figures for the 1980s from the 
respective ministries of finance. In all cases the budget deficit is for the central government.  
A leaner, meaner guardian?  
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)  15
The set membership thresholds are determined by Hofstede’s way of calculating his indi-
ces. He derives the index scores from a set of survey questions which are compiled into an 
index. The index scores are aggregated so that they reach from 0 to 100 in the great major-
ity of cases. The actual variation between countries is such that very low scores are ex-
ceedingly rare, while scores somewhat higher than 100 are quite possible in the case of 
some indices. The point at which a country can be considered average in terms of a certain 
dimension varies between indices. I therefore calculate the crossover point as the mean of 
all scores across the 22 countries, while the values for full membership and non-
membership are 100 and 0, respectively.  
First, the Power Distance Index (PDI) tries to capture the degree of inequality between 
decision-makers and subordinates practiced, tolerated and desired in a society. “Power 
distance is a measure of the interpersonal power or influence between B[oss] and 
S[ubordinate]” (Hofstede 2003, 83). A country’s PDI score measures the degree of power 
distance within organizational settings that is accepted and supported by the social envi-
ronment. For the set of high PDI scoring countries, the crossover point is set at 44.45. 
The second measure is the Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI). It measures attitudes to-
wards rule orientation, employment stability and stress (Hofstede 2003, 145). The term 
was coined in Cyert and March’s behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert / March 1963) to 
describe the ways firms use different strategies to stabilize their operations from uncertain-
ties arising in their environment. The higher the score, the more intolerance towards un-
certainty prevails in an organization. The crossover point for this set is 60.73.  
Third, I use Hofstede’s Individualism Index (IDV). A high score on the index equals a 
higher value given to individualism, as opposed to collectivism. In concrete terms, it looks 
at the importance of individual challenges and personal freedom a person seeks in an or-
ganization (209). The degree of individualism strongly affects the relationship between the 
organization as a whole and its individual staff. A low score on the IDV indicates more 
support for rules and structures that constrain and align individual behavior within organi-
zations. The crossover point is set at 60.73. 
An organizational culture supportive of lean macro-level controls would be characterized 
by low power distance, allowing for a dismantling of the hierarchical structures that often 
come with micro controls (low grid), low uncertainty-avoidance, making it possible for 
central ministries to loosen their oversight over spending ministries and a high level of 
individualism, to match the low group characteristics of macro controls. Conversely, a 
culture that prizes collectivism, redundancy, rules and hierarchy would not fit well with a 
move towards macro controls. 
 
Table 3: Comparison Germany vs. UK 
Country Micro Macro PDI UAI IDV Austerity Deficits 
GERMANY 7.14 1.67 35 65 67 2 -2.49 
GREAT BRITAIN 2.37 9.17 35 35 89 7 -2.75 
Source: Author 
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This distinction can be illustrated by a comparison between Germany and the United 
Kingdom. In fiscal institutionalist terms, these two countries should not differ much. They 
are both prime cases for the delegation model of centralization of power within the finance 
ministry (Hallerberg 2004), because their election systems are competitive and create sta-
ble, ideologically coherent governments. Indeed both countries had, on average, relatively 
low deficits over the 1980-2005 period, low enough to comfortably satisfy the Maastricht 
deficit criterion. Yet, they organize their control in nearly mirror-imaged ways; Germany 
strongly focusing on micro controls, the UK on the macro level. The UK had seven aus-
tere budget cycles since 1980, Germany only two, indicating that the pressure to reform 
was much higher in Britain. The level of individualism in Britain is in fact among the 
highest in the sample, while Germany’s intolerance of uncertainty is almost twice that of 
the UK. It seems that Germany never saw much need to change its budget process, and 
even if it did, its bureaucracy would not have been fertile ground for macro level controls.  
A final institutional feature to consider is the distinction between parliamentary and presi-
dential systems. The large majority of countries, 18 out of 22, are parliamentary democra-
cies. Here, the prime minister and his government are elected by the legislature, even 
though the budgetary power of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive may differ consid-
erably. However, 4 countries are presidential (where the head of the executive is directly 
elected). The coding into presidential and parliamentary countries follows the World 
Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001), where semi-presidential coun-
tries such as France and Finland are coded as parliamentary, reflecting the limited role of 
the elected chief executive in domestic policymaking. A look at their control regimes 
shows that several of the non-parliamentary countries seem to be outliers, notably Chile 
and South Korea as the two most obsessive controllers overall. It is therefore necessary to 
consider if the causal dynamics in non-parliamentary countries are different. Set member-
ships are coded as follows: a presidential system scores a “1”, a parliamentary system a 
“0”. The crossover point is 0.5.5 
The outcome is defined as the score on the index of macro-control institutions (Krause 
2009). This index measures the degree of centralized control over macro-budgetary deci-
sions within the central budget agency. Possible scores range from “0” to “10”, while ac-
tual scores range from “0” (Belgium) to “9.17” (UK). The index is composed of five sub-
stantive dimensions that correspond to measurable budgetary practices and procedures 
(see Table 1). Partial scores in each dimension are possible. To adjust for realistically pos-
sible scores, full set membership comes with a score of 8, and non-membership at 1. For 
countries to be considered deliberate adopters of macro-level controls, some instruments 
should be visible in several dimensions. The crossover point is therefore set at 3.5.  
In fuzzy-set QCA analysis, it is standard practice to see if any single condition is a neces-
sary condition before proceeding. In this case, no necessary conditions were found. The 
core fsQCA analysis is essentially a sufficiency test - a way of determining which combi-
nation of variables is sufficient to bring about the outcome. Sufficiency would signify that 
the presence of a certain causal combination would always see the presence of the out-
come as well. In regular QCA analysis, which operates with binary values, this operation 
is relatively straightforward, because set memberships are unambiguous. The transforma-
                                                 
5  For technical reasons the crossover point should not be a value that actually exists in the dataset. 
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tion of memberships into fuzzy sets, while much more nuanced, makes the sufficiency test 
slightly more complicated. In fuzzy sets, each case has always a degree of membership 
and non-membership in a certain set.  
In empirical applications it would be exceedingly rare if a single condition were enough to 
explain a great deal. Usually combinations of causal factors are the only way to offer mea-
ningful explanations. Causal combinations can be created using the two Boolean operators 
“AND” and “OR”. In the case of fuzzy sets, combining two values with a Boolean AND 
results in a combined value equaling the lower of the two original values. In other words, 
the combination is created by the lowest common value, the “weakest link”, as it were 
(Rihoux / Ragin 2008). A combination based on a Boolean OR takes the highest value 
among the original values. A solution based on the combination of various causal condi-
tions is considered sufficient to bring about the outcome if cases exhibit a value on the 
outcome that is at least as high as or higher than the value of the solution. The solution 
would then be a subset of the outcome, and therefore it is always present in cases that also 
exhibit the outcome.  
5 Results: zealous controllers versus modern finance ministries 
This section will present the results of the fsQCA analysis and discuss the findings in 
terms of their theoretical and practical implications. The results show two causal paths 
leading to the occurrence of a high degree of membership in the set of countries with 
strong macro-level control, in Boolean notation 
 
 
 
 
 
“Austerity” stands for austere budget cycles, “pres” for presidentialism, “pdi” for power 
distance index, “uai” for uncertainty avoidance index, “idv” for individualism index and 
“macroscore” for the index of macro-level controls. In Boolean notation, a variable in ca-
pital letters is present; lower case letters denote its absence. The multiplication sign “*” 
signifies a Boolean “AND”, meaning that all conditions have to be present (or absent) for 
the outcome to be present (or absent). The addition sign “+” denotes a Boolean OR. 
QCA analysis describes the explanatory power of a solution in terms of its consistency 
and coverage. This solution has a consistency score of 0.84, meaning that this logical path 
covers practically all the variation in those countries where a high macro score occurs and 
the solution term applies. In QCA analysis, consistency measures the degree to which em-
pirical evidence supports the claim that a set-theoretic relation exists. In the fsQCA litera-
ture, values between 0.8 and 0.99 are considered valid causal explanations (Rihoux / Ragin 
2008), although in some cases even lower values of 0.7 or 0.65 might yield valuable re-
sults (Jackson 2005; Katz / vom Hau / Mahoney 2005). The coverage of this solution is 
0.66, meaning that about two thirds of the occurrence of the outcome are explained by the 
solution. Given the relative simplicity of this solution, this is a good level of coverage. In 
   
pres*   pdi* 
uai*IDV+
 AUSTERITY *   (  PRES*PDI*UAI*idv
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other words, this solution term clearly confirms the hypothesis that only specific organiza-
tional cultures combined with reform pressure cause countries to adopt macro level con-
trols. 
The only term that the two possible causal paths have in common is the presence of auster-
ity; that is reform pressure caused by a high number of austere budget cycles in the past 
(see figure 3). The causal paths then separate over the combination of organizational cul-
ture and political system. In parliamentary countries (countries with a low “pres” score), 
the absence of power distance and uncertainty avoidance, combined with the presence of 
individualism explains the presence of high macro level controls. This solution path cov-
ers the much larger share of the total solution (with a raw coverage6 of 0.53). In presiden-
tial countries, it is exactly the opposite, only countries where power distance and uncer-
tainty avoidance are present, while individualism is absent, display the outcome. This 
group of presidential countries is quite small; it only contributes a limited raw coverage of 
0.23 to the total solution term.  
The configurations for presidential and parliamentary countries are very interesting, be-
cause they imply that in different combinations, individual variables can have contradic-
tory effects. Parliamentary countries with high power difference and high uncertainty 
avoidance, such as Germany, do not develop strong macro level controls. The fact that the 
head of the executive is not elected by the legislature, thus removing the ministry of fi-
nance and spending ministries to some extent from the legislature, seems to strongly affect 
the way top officials within the central government employ expenditure control instru-
ments.  
In several presidential systems, governments do not usually see the need to dismantle their 
traditional controls in the process. This move is not an expression of NPM ideas and indi-
vidualist organizational culture within the executive bureaucracy; it is a way to add an-
other layer of control on top of powers that already exist. Countries like Chile or South 
Korea are indeed the “zealous” controllers, where hierarchy and control are a defining 
element of the bureaucracy. These are also countries where the budgetary power of the 
executive vis-à-vis the legislature is relatively strong – allowing top officials to shape their 
control system in an administrative context that exists one step removed from the demands 
of external accountability. Note that it is not presidentialism that “causes” some countries 
to move towards macro-budgetary controls, it is the particular combination of organiza-
tional culture, reform pressure and political system that does. They are not following the 
ideal path of modernization; instead, they create a hybrid regime quite unlike the model 
originally intended by policymakers in the original modernizing countries. The structure 
of the organization in question, i.e. the ministry of finance, is not being transformed, but 
reinforced in accordance with the long-standing preferences of its professional staff 
(Brunsson 1989; Lapsley 2008, 90).  
 
 
                                                 
6  The raw coverage measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome explained by this causal 
path.  
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Figure 2:  The results within the causal model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 4 plots the presence of the outcome against the presence of the solution to illustrate 
the explanatory power of the sufficiency test. It shows that for most countries, the degree 
of membership in the outcome is at least as high as or higher than the degree of member-
ship in the solution, thus fulfilling the requirements of a subset relationship between out-
come and solution. The figure also shows the causes for the consistency being less than 
one. There are two strong outliers, Mexico and Denmark, and two lesser ones, Austria and 
Belgium. They all have lower macro-level controls than expected.  
The three parliamentary countries are relatively easy to explain, because they are all cases 
where fiscal institutionalists would not expect a high degree of control within the central 
government to emerge. Denmark had minority governments in all but two years since 
1980, while Belgium’s political system is too unstable to support the emergence of a 
strong finance ministry (Hallerberg 2004; Hallerberg / Strauch / von Hagen 2009). In Aus-
tria, the causal configuration is inconclusive. Its fiscal performance should create high 
pressure for reform, but its organizational culture suggests that there is little appeal in 
wholesale modernization. Furthermore, the Austrian political system is quite unstable as 
well (Hallerberg 2004, 214–17). 
 
The position of Mexico, a presidential democracy, is less clear. Like Chile, it has strong 
micro-level controls, and certainly enough experience with fiscal austerity to put pressure 
on the central government to increase controls further. Its organizational culture is similar 
enough to Chile’s to suggest that it should be much closer to the other presidential coun-
tries in the sample. One possible explanation is that Mexico became a proper democracy 
about a decade after Chile, and is currently implementing reforms similar to the Chilean 
reforms of the 1990s (Curristine / Emery / Krause 2009), which could mean that Mexico 
Figure 3:  Test for sufficiency of solution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
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would develop a system similar to Chile’s over the next few years. The existence of these 
outliers does not invalidate the overall analysis. Given the complexity of modern societies 
it would be exceedingly unrealistic to expect every country to neatly fit into the causal 
setup outlined with just five conditions. The scores for consistency and coverage are well 
within the limits set by fsQCA practitioners and allow a generally positive confirmation of 
the analytical framework.  
6 Conclusion 
This paper argues that the development of strong macro-level controls can be explained by 
a combination of external reform pressure and the internal preferences of government offi-
cials, which is, in turn, shaped by the organizational culture. It also shows that there is no 
single determining factor that could explain why some countries move towards strong 
macro-controls while others seem happy not to. Countries like Chile on the one hand, and 
United Kingdom (UK) on the other, display similar macro-level controls, but they clearly 
use them in a very different context. Civil servants seem to have a substantial degree of 
discretion over the fiscal control regime they prefer. While the UK and other modernizing 
countries used the introduction of strong macro-level controls to dismantle the traditional 
micro control apparatus they had before, Chile and other zealous controllers readily intro-
duced the new set of instruments on top of the strong controls that were already in place.  
The results show that institutional innovation does not travel seamlessly between coun-
tries. New budgetary tools did not spread from the initial reformers because budget offi-
cials were uniformly convinced of their intrinsic value. Some countries followed the mod-
ernizing reform path, in others the new tools were integrated into different systems and 
thus turned into a setup not imagined by the original designers. Leaving aside the coun-
tries where the establishment of any type of budgetary centralization is not feasible, there 
are still enough holdouts where macro-controls could be established. However, it seems 
that officials in these countries believe that the costs of reform would not be justified 
given that they already have an acceptable degree of fiscal performance sans reform, and 
that modernization ill matches their cultural preferences. 
The uneven adoption of macro-level controls has implications for budgetary reforms in 
developing countries as well. Many reforms in developing countries that took place with 
support from international donors over the last decade are quite similar to the moderniza-
tion model described in this paper. It seems that these reforms are being applied in very 
different places without much consideration for local institutional, economic or social con-
text (Andrews 2009; de Renzio 2009). The variation observed in rich countries suggests 
that it would be extremely unlikely for the very diverse group of developing countries to 
fit the same set of budgetary tools. If anything, the high incidence of traditional, hierarchi-
cal and informal public administration practices in many developing countries would sug-
gest that they fit the causal configuration of the successful modernizing countries rather 
less than many developed places. The evidence from this paper would strongly caution 
against a uniform adoption of macro-level controls in many countries. 
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Data Annex 
Full Results of fsQCA Analysis 
Model: MACROSCORE = f(PDI, UAI, IDV, AUSTERITY, PRES)   
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey    
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---  
frequency cutoff: 1.000; consistency cutoff: 0.825 
Solution Raw cover-
age 
Unique coverage Consistency 
AUSTERITY* pres*pdi*uai*IDV+ 0.533 0.432 0.870 
AUSTERITY* PRES*PDI*UAI*idv  0.230 0.129 0.825 
solution coverage: 0.661; solution consistency: 0.842 
 
Calibrated Scores  
caseid Micro-
score 
Macro-
score 
PDI UAI IDV Auster-
ity 
Pres 
AUSTRALIA 0.45 0.61 0.36 0.38 0.9 0.5 0.05 
AUSTRIA 0.83 0.1 0.09 0.67 0.43 0.95 0.05 
BELGIUM 0.32 0.01 0.75 0.93 0.75 0.18 0.05 
CANADA 0.04 0.65 0.41 0.35 0.81 0.82 0.05 
CHILE 0.96 0.91 0.73 0.87 0.13 0.5 0.95 
DENMARK 0.02 0.23 0.14 0.13 0.73 0.99 0.05 
FINLAND 0.14 0.61 0.32 0.48 0.54 1 0.05 
FRANCE 0.03 0.52 0.78 0.87 0.69 0.5 0.05 
GERMANY 0.92 0.1 0.35 0.58 0.62 0.05 0.05 
GREAT 
BRITAIN 
0.2 0.98 0.35 0.22 0.9 0.99 0.05 
GREECE 0.7 0.61 0.7 0.98 0.22 1 0.05 
IRELAND 0.45 0.73 0.25 0.22 0.67 0.5 0.05 
ISRAEL 0.44 0.45 0.11 0.82 0.42 1 0.05 
ITALY 0.53 0.45 0.57 0.75 0.76 0.18 0.05 
JAPAN 0.53 0.07 0.63 0.92 0.33 0.82 0.05 
MEXICO 0.96 0.37 0.88 0.84 0.18 0.82 0.95 
NETHER-
LANDS 
0.22 0.61 0.39 0.41 0.81 0.95 0.05 
Philipp Krause 
  German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 28 
PORTUGAL 0.31 0.1 0.73 0.96 0.16 1 0.05 
SOUTH KO-
REA 
0.76 0.85 0.7 0.86 0.11 0.5 0.95 
SPAIN 0.65 0.18 0.66 0.87 0.38 0.18 0.05 
SWEDEN 0.13 0.73 0.29 0.17 0.69 0.95 0.05 
USA 0.2 0.23 0.43 0.33 0.91 0.82 0.95 
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